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Using visual salience in empirical game theory 
𝑋𝑖𝑎𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑛 𝐿𝑖!      𝐶𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑛 𝐶𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑟!,! 
Coordination games often have salient “focal points”. In games 
where choices are locations in images, we test for the effect of 
salience, predicted a priori using a neuroscience-based algorithm, 
Concentration of salience is correlated with the rate of matching 
when players are trying to match (r=.64). In hider-seeker games, all 
players choose salient locations more often, creating a “seeker’s 
advantage” (seekers win 9% of games). Salience-choice relations 
are explained by a salience-enhanced cognitive hierarchy model. 
The novel prediction that time pressure will increases seeker’s 
advantage, by biasing choices toward salience, is confirmed. Other 
links to salience in economics are suggested.  
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1.  Introduction 
At the US-Mexico border, “coyotes” traffic people illegally through the desert 
for money, hoping they can reach “safe houses” and eventually work in the US. 
The US Customs and Border Patrol (CBP) officers try to intercept coyotes (Urrea 
2008). The coyotes and CBP are playing a hider-seeker game.  
“In-ground sensors are buried in places known only to the Border Patrol. These 
sensors are known as Oscars. A Coyote [trafficker] would give his teeth to get 
hold of this information…. Sometimes the sensors are very cleverly placed—their 
little antennas stick up in the middle of creosote bushes. Cutters [coyotes] know 
that saguaros, the signature big cactus of the region, always grow among 
sheltering shrubs. So a stately old saguaro will not only serve as a signpost for the 
walkers [immigrants entering illegally], but a landmark for the cutters [coyotes], 
and the landmark has a scribble of handy bushes around it to hide the wire.” 
 The tall saguaro cactuses are good landmarks for coyotes remembering a safe 
route, because they are easily seen from a distance. But the saguaros only grow 
next to prickly creosote bushes with ground cover, a perfect place to hide Oscar 
sensors and make them unsalient.  
In the game between coyotes and CBP, how strategic choices are physically 
perceived in the environment is an essential part of the game. If the strategy 
choices (locations) were described verbally or labeled Si, and a payoff-isomorphic 
game was played using only those labels, it is likely that behavior would be 
different, because visual perception is erased by the relabellings.1  
                                                
1 Another natural hider-seeker game is password choice. Cybersecurity experts all know, and bemoan, the fact that 
user-assigned passwords are often easy to hack. People use familiar characters such as names, nicknames, initials, or birth 
dates, presumably to aid their memory (Zviran and Haga 1999). Websites often require at least one digit or special 
character to make passwords less hackable. However, one study showed that when ending their passwords with one or two 
digits, 24% of people chose to end in a single digit, 1. Such a tendency creates a strong “seeker’s advantage”.  In this case, 
of course, the seeker’s advantage may exist in equilibrium if users with poor memories know they are choosing hackable 
passwords.  
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Schelling (1960) famously promoted the idea that how strategies are labeled— 
whether by visual salience, language, cultural importance, precedent, or in many 
other “psychologically prominent” ways— was necessary to predict what people 
would actually do in certain types of games, especially those involving 
coordination. Simply knowing an abstract, unlabeled assignment of strategy 
vectors to valued outcomes, Schelling conjectured, is not enough to predict 
accurately—and also gives no normative advice about what to do. Furthermore, 
when the goal is coordination, focality of strategies depends on a shared concept 
of salience. Focal strategies must stand out, and people must know they stand out 
to game partners.    
This paper is about visual salience as a source of focality in games. In general, 
salience is defined as what makes a feature of a stimulus grab attention 
quickly.  There are many scientific advantages to specifically studying salience of 
visual images. A lot is known about what visual features are immediately visually 
salient, based on observing steps of visual processing in the brain. It is also easy 
to do experiments with visual stimuli, and to alter images electronically to change 
their salience. And because visual perception is fast and requires almost no 
instruction, people can play hundreds of game-trials in experimental sessions. 
Visual displays can also be used in a wider variety of experiments on human 
populations, including children and illiterate adults, and in non-human animals, 
than semantic descriptions or matrix forms. 
We study the effect of visual salience in both coordination games and 
competitive games. The coordination games are “matching” games. In matching 
games, players try to choose the same strategy chosen by their partners. If they 
match, they earn a fixed reward (which is independent of which strategy 
matched.) In the competitive “hider-seeker” game, one player — the “hider”-- 
earns a payoff if they mismatch by choosing different strategies. The “seeker” 
earns a payoff if they match strategies.  
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Our approach to focality in games is novel because we use a precise concept of 
saliency of image locations from a Saliency Attentive Model (SAM) algorithm 
developed in computer vision science. We also use eyetracking to examine 
associations between what people look at, what the SAM algorithm predicts they 
will look at, and what they choose.  
The main goal of our study is to see if there is a generalizable (or “portable”) 
concept of salience that can be applied to games with different coordination and 
competition payoff structures. For example, does the way that salience influences 
coordinated matching help predict how salience influences competitive hider-
seeker games? Heap et al (2014) argue that the answer is No, in their data (from a 
different class of multi-object games). Crawford (2007) offers a rebuttal.    
A related portability question is whether salience is useful as a general 
foundation for level-0 behavior. Different level-0 specifications have been used in 
matrix games, in games with numerical strategies or labeled strategies, and in 
private information games. Can they all be considered a product of some sort of 
salience? We’ll return to this question in the Conclusion section 7. We also 
discuss whether salience used in economic choice domains (such as tax incidence 
and pricing) might be understood using visual salience concepts. 
The next section (2) discusses some classic experimental studies of focality in 
games. Then in section 3 we introduce the visual image paradigm and algorithms 
that predict what features are salient. Section 4 describes our experimental design 
and basic results. In section 5 we present a salience-enhanced cognitive hierarchy 
model.  We measure how well it can explain data, and whether it can portably do 
cross-game prediction. Section 6 tests whether time pressure increases the 
influence of salience. We also show how eyetracking data and choice are tied 
together in a hidden Markov model (HMM). Section 7 concludes by discussing 
salience more generally in recent game theory and economic applications, and 
pointing to future research.  
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2. Background 
a. Bottom-up and top-down salience  
In psychology, attention-getting features that are salient are usefully divided 
into two categories: Bottom-up and top-down (Frintrop, Rome, and Christensen 
2010).  
Bottom-up features are based on sensory physical features such as color, 
contrast, and orientation. Bottom-up feature salience is devoid of personal 
meaning and independent of task goals. To the extent that human visual systems 
work the same way all around the world, the attention-grabbing salience of 
bottom-up features should be universal. As a result, attentional data from many 
diverse subject pools can establish what is bottom-up.  
For example, the stick figure “I” is perceived, bottom-up, as a black vertical line 
of a certain length, with slightly extended top and bottom horizontal lines on top 
of the vertical line, surrounded by contrast with a white background. Primates, 
babies, and adult humans all have the same immediate perception. From the 
bottom-up view the stimulus “I” is not made more or less salient because it is a 
capital letter, a pronoun for “myself” in English, the Roman numeral one, or 
reminds you of an iconic column your interior decorator suggested for the front 
porch of your house. All the latter forms of salience are “top-down”: they use 
semantic knowledge about the (local, acculturated) world, include what is 
personally relevant, valued, familiar, and novel.  
Bottom-up attention seems to emerge from rapid visual neural processing which 
is essentially common to humans (excepting disorders) and many other species. 
Inspired by a deep understanding of visual cortex, a series of progressively 
improving algorithms have been developed to use visual images as inputs, and 
output predictions about where people will look in the first 1000msec of 
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processing (Harel, Koch, and Perona 2007; Itti, Koch, and Niebur 1998; Judd et 
al. 2009).  
 However, as the “I” example suggests, many types of top-down meaning and 
value have been shown to be salient because they also grab attention. Variables 
that increase top-down salience in perception and choice include prior beliefs, 
recent choice history (Awh, Belopolsky, and Theeuwes 2012), familiarity and 
novelty (Itti and Baldi 2009), value for consumer goods (Towal, Mormann, and 
Koch 2013), and self-reported “meaning” (Henderson and Hayes 2017). Evidence 
also suggests that top-down attention allocation occurs more slowly than bottom-
up attention. The SAM algorithm we will use is tuned using human free gaze data. 
Since the humans have no special goal to achieve during free viewing, the 
salience that is being captured algorithmically is probably a combination of 
bottom-up features, and top-down features (such as familiarity, novelty, special 
attention to faces, etc.) which grab the attention of the particular subject 
population.   
b. Previous evidence of focality in games  
We begin with Schelling’s (1960) map example. He writes:  
 “Two people parachute unexpectedly into the area shown, each with a map 
and knowing  the other has one, but neither knowing where the other has dropped 
nor able to communicate directly. They must get together quickly to be rescued. 
Can they study their  maps and “coordinate” their behavior?” (p. 56) 
The map (Figure 1a) shows small houses, a pond in the lower left, two places 
marked x and y, and a river running horizontally through the lower third of the 
map, with a bridge centrally located across the river. Schelling reports that seven 
of eight people, whom he asked informally, chose the bridge as the place to 
rendezvous.  
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In a proper experiment, N=61 UCLA students incentivized to match chose the 
bridge 59% of the time (see Figure 1b). Indeed, the SAM saliency map predicts 
the bridge is highly salient (Figure 1c). However, while SAM does not predict the 
“x spot” is especially salient, it was chosen by 25% of the subjects.  
This example illustrates the value of bottom-up saliency, which explains why 
the bridge stands out-- it has the most dark/light contrast, and is close to central. 
The example also illustrates the the value of top-down saliency in games: The x is 
meaningful for those familiar with cultural knowledge about maps like these (“x 
marks the spot”). But its basic features—two diagonal lines crossing—are nothing 
special to a bottom-up-guided eye. 
 
 
 
FIGURE 1 SCHELLING’S MAP REVISITED 
(a) original map) (b) choice frequencies heatmap, the redness indicates choice frequency (c) SAM algorithm predicted 
saliency heatmap   
  
There was a long lag between Schelling’s early discussion of focality and later 
bursts of more careful experimentation. (Mehta, Starmer, and Sugden 1994; 
Bacharach and Bernasconi 1997) 
Bacharach and Bernasconi (1997) proposed general principles underlying 
focality. Their domain was coordination games in which people choose one of 
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several displayed objects (stars, triangles, etc.) which are not exactly the same but 
can be categorized into groups. They offer principles governing when objects 
lumped in a group will be chosen, depending on whether differences are noticed. 
The empirical problem with their approach is that subjects almost always 
exhibited the capacity to deem one of the ‘identical’ objects in a group as more 
focal than the others.2 Thus, their ambitious theory was missing a detailed method 
for predictably identifying what makes different choice objects more or less focal.   
Focality is interesting in a different way in hider-seeker games (HS). In HS 
games a hider seeks to mismatch strategy choices and a seeker chooses to match 
strategy choices. In the simplest games, which we study, payoffs are either zero or 
a fixed unit prize, which does not vary with the location matches. In these games 
there is a unique Nash equilibrium: All agents should choose all locations equally 
often, regardless of whether they are hiding or seeking. However, a bias toward 
focal locations could lead hiders to get caught more often (a “seeker’s 
advantage”), or could lead seekers to locations that hiders know to avoid, so that 
that they catch hiders less frequently (a “hider’s advantage”).   
An influential study (Rubinstein, Tversky, and Heller 1997) (RTH) used a four-
choice hider-seeker game. Their canonical example is a choice between four 
letters ordered sequentially from left-to-right:   
 
A   B  A A 
 
RTH hypothesize that the left and right A’s are avoided (because of “extremity-
aversion”; cf. (Bar-Hillel 2015). They hypothesize that the single B is clearly 
focal because it is visually and semantically unique; and it will therefore be 
                                                
2
 In a pilot experiment with the five-object example (In an N=62 pilot experiment conducted with Mili Moorman and 
Alec Smith, 73% chose the triangle and 24% the trapezoid. Only 3% chose the circle-- as Bacharach and Bernasconi’s 
principle that the singleton polygons are equally focal and hence disqualified-- predicted.)  
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avoided by hiders. That leaves the third “interior” A from the left, which is least 
focal by compared to other choices (and therefore uniquely non-focal). They 
predicted that the third A would be chosen most often. Indeed, in their 
experiments the third A is chosen most frequently both by hiders (40%) and 
seekers (45%). As a result, there is a “seeker advantage” because the seekers win 
more often than predicted by Nash equilibrium (which predicts a 25% seeker win 
rate from random matching).3  
An important paper by Falk, Falk, and Ayton (2009) collected a lot of data in 
paradigms similar to the four letter choice. One paradigm consisted of choosing 3 
cells out of the 25 locations in a 5x5 matrix. They observe an edge aversion and a 
very high seeker advantage.4 In another paradigm people choose strings of five 
letters, each either A or B. The strings AAAA, BBBB, ABABA (and opposite 
strings switching A for B) were most popular in matching. The string ABBAB 
was most popular in hider-seeker. They note that the latter string is similar to one 
posited as most “subjectively representative” by Kahneman and Tversky (1972), 
because it nearly balances A and B proportions, and does not have too many long 
or short streaks.  
Crawford and Iriberri (2007a) (hereafter CI) advanced a different analysis of 
games like ABAA, based on level-k modelling. They hypothesized that behavior 
could be consistent with a level-k approach in which level-0 behavior is 
influenced by salience (Stahl II and Wilson 1994; Nagel 1995; Crawford, Costa-
Gomes, and Iriberri 2013). Specifically, CI assumed that level k type only best 
responded to level k-1 types starting from level zero, and that the population 
didn’t contain any actual level zero types. Under this framework, they estimated 
                                                
3
 Camerer, Moorman and Smith collected pilot data from Caltech and UCLA subjects on a similar AABA game. They 
observe a slightly lower rate of choice of the inner A (28.6%; 22% for N=59 hiders and 36% for N=53 seekers) than in 
most other studies.  
4
 Based on data reported in their paper, the seeking win rate in this experiment is 10.37% while the chance level is only 
6.25%, a seeker advantage of +4.12%.  These numbers are very close to our own although the paradigms differ 
dramatically.  
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both level zero players’ preferences towards different options (saliency biases) 
and population type frequencies. The general approach fits behavioral well. (Our 
paper expands on this approach by predicting saliency independently of choice, 
using neuroscientifically-inspired computational algorithms, and with choices of 
locations in visual images as strategies.) 
Hargreaves Heap, Rojo Arjona, and Sugden (2014) questioned the strength of 
the CI conclusions by testing the portability of level-0 assumptions in the type of 
level-k theory CI used across different games. They argued that the existing tests 
for level-0 behavior was not sufficiently helpful because most of them used an ex 
post model-fitting approach. Heap et al used ex ante hypothesis testing in games 
with natural choice sets where one choice is an “oddity” (i.e., semantically 
distinctive). One set is a series of six black dots and one white dot. Another set is 
a list of disease words and the word “fitness”. In matching, players strongly 
coordinate on the oddity. Subjects also played games with coordination, 
discoordination (players both win if they both choose something different) and 
hider-seeker payoff structure. Using the oddity as the level 0 specification, they 
conclude that deterministic level-k predictions do not explain differences in 
oddity choice rates across the other four games and roles. Crawford (2014) 
comments on their paper. We did not reach the same conclusion as Heap et al 
because structural predictions derived from one game type do generalize to a 
different payoff structure game (see section 6), although we did not study 
discoordination games as they did. 
 
c. What we do that’s new 
Our study goes further than previous research in five ways:  
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(i) salience is predicted by an underlying computational theory of 
which features of an information display are salient (the SAM 
algorithm);  
(ii) salience is also measured independently of both choice and the 
SAM model (using eye tracking);  
(iii) the salience hypothesized by (i) and measured by (ii) is then 
correlated with strategic choices; 
(iv) a salience-enhanced cognitive hierarchy (SCH) model is 
estimated and used to portably explain data in one game based on 
estimates from another game with different payoff structure; 
(v) differences in the influence of salience are experimentally 
manipulated (using time pressure) to see whether time pressure 
causally changes choices. (It does.) 
 
3. The Saliency Attentive Model (SAM) algorithm 
Visual saliency algorithms are being actively researched. The goal of these 
algorithms is to predict where neurotypical adult humans will look when they are 
freely gazing at images. Note, by the way, that these algorithms were not 
designed to predict active choices in matching and hider-seeker games. Such 
choices are likely to be guided by shared salience (matching) and strategic 
thinking (HS). The payoff structures create top-down task goals which are not 
part of subject instruction in the data created and used to train the algorithms.  
We used a recent state-of-the-art algorithm, Saliency Attentive Model (SAM) to 
obtain a normalized saliency map for each image (Cornia et al. 2016). The SAM 
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algorithm is based on a recent machine learning method called a convolutional 
long short-term memory network (LSTM). The network is trained on the four 
most popular saliency datasets (SALICON, MIT1003, MIT300, CAT2000) and is 
trained to best predict actual human gaze patterns recorded from eyetracking. To 
justify its accuracy, the reported performance of SAM on the website MIT-
Saliency is 0.88 using the AUC-Judd measure (Riche et al. 2013), where .5 is 
chance and 1.0 is perfectly accurate. This accuracy significantly surpasses earlier 
algorithms, and approaches the accuracy of the best human-to-human benchmark5 
(0.9).   
The SAM algorithm takes one image as input and outputs its predicted saliency 
map. The algorithm assigns a saliency value from zero to one (least salient to 
most salient) to each pixel on an image. We adopted the default parameters from 
the original approach and applied it to our image dataset. As a result, the saliency 
predictions we are making have no free parameters at all. (However, other 
parameters will be introduced below to map the link from saliency levels to 
strategic choice.) Figure 2 is a specific example of the SAM saliency map from 
one of the pictures we used in our experiments. 
 
                                                
5
 The best human benchmark indicates how much do two large different sets of human fixation maps correlate. Each set 
contains many different individuals. Thus, this limitation is due to individual differences of their fixation patterns (Judd, 
Durand, and Torralba 2012) 
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FIGURE 2: A SALIENCY ALGORITHM EXAMPLE.  
 a: An original image. b: The SAM saliency map, in which the brightness indicates salient level. (the whitest point is the 
most salient spot). c: The area of original image which is 75% most salient. This area is generated from ranking all saliency 
values of each pixel and take the ones that fall in first 75%. The other two plots on this figure use the output directly from 
the SAM algorithm without taking the ranks. d: the original image with a saliency heatmap overlaid onto it (“warmer” red 
colors indicate higher saliency). 
 
4. Experimental Procedure 
The strategy space of this task consists of all the pixels in each image. This 
large range gives us large variation in salience, and salience can be studied 
directly with eye-tracking.  
Participants: This study was pre-registered on the Open Science Framework 
(https://osf.io/yuqjg/) during data collection and before analysis process. The 
sample size was pre-determined before the data collection process, based on a 
pilot study carried out in March 2017.  N=	29 subjects participated (13 males, 16 
females) one at a time, in a small testing room.  An additional N=69 subjects 
participated online through Amazon mechanical turk (“mTurk”). Among people 
who participated in the lab, N = 24 had their gaze data recorded. Fifteen of those 
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subjects belonged to Caltech community and 14 were from the neighboring 
community. None of them had a college major or work experience within 
economics or computer vision field. These subjects were tested individually in our 
lab testing room, and all gave informed consent to participate in research.  
 
Experimental design 
The experiment consisted of three blocks of games: matching, hide-and-seek as 
seeker, and hide-and-seek as hider (Figure 3). The matching block always came 
first, followed by the hide and seek blocks in randomized order. During each 
block (game), subjects experienced two sub-blocks: “feedback” sub-block in 
which the results are revealed right after and “no feedback” sub-block in which no 
results are revealed. Matching game consisted of 20 images for each sub-block 
and the hider-seeker game shared the same set of 19 images for each sub-block. 
There was unlimited time to read instructions and break but only 6s to make a 
choice for one trial. The results shown in the feedback condition were drawn from 
previously tested actual subjects (different subjects for each image shown, of 
which participants were informed).  
Since the image fills the entire screen, if the circle hits any boundary of the 
screen, the rest of the circle extended from (i.e., wrapped around) the other side of 
the screen to avoid any boundary advantage.  
 
FIGURE 3: TIME STEPS IN THE EXPERIMENT.  Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3308886 
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One image here stands for 20 or 19 shuffled images depending on games in each sub-block. In each block, the order of sub-
blocks was also shuffled. The matching block always came first and the other two blocks came in randomized order.  
Images within each block were presented in randomized order. 
 
Two choices were considered a match if two circles centered at their choice 
spots (with radius of 108 pixels) overlapped, regardless of the extent of overlap. 
(We use the word “match” for all three blocks, obviously corresponding to 
winning for seeker and losing for hider in the hider-seeker games.) Figure 4 
shows examples of result screens that subjects saw during the experiment. The 
local group and online groups both participated in the same experimental design.  
 
 
FIGURE 4：EXAMPLES OF TRIAL OUTCOMES. 
 (a) an example of mismatch (the green and red circles are not overlapping). (b) a trial in the no-feedback condition, with 
the green circle showing the participant’s choice (c,d)  two examples in which choices were successfully matched (because 
the red and green circles overlapped).  
 
Stimuli 
Ninety-two (92) colored visual images were displayed on an eye tracking 
monitor (1920x1080 resolution). Images were randomly selected from a large 
image pool (273) with five categories (abstract art, city, face, social, nature). The 
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image set contains both high entropy images and low entropy6 images. High 
entropy images tend to have only one central object while images in low entropy 
images often have many different salient locations (Judd, et. al 2009). 
 
Eye Tracking Procedure 
Subjects sat comfortably about 50cm in front of the screen while their eye 
movements were monitored with a Tobii TX300 eye-tracker with a sampling rate 
of 300Hz. Presentation of the game used the Matlab Psychophysics tool box. A 
nine-point calibration was performed in the beginning of the experiment. Before 
each sub-block, there was a drift correction phase in which subjects need to focus 
on a dot in the center of the screen. The experiment only proceeded, after drift 
correction, if the gaze detection was still accurate. Otherwise, the eye-tracker 
would automatically enter a second calibration session then continue. Between 
presentation of sequential images, a fixation cross was presented on a gray screen 
for one second to wash out any remaining gaze trace from the last image. 
 
5. Analysis and Results 
a. Equilibrium analysis 
Equilibrium analysis generates a statistical benchmark for what people might 
do.7 The structure of our games deviates from previous matching games, because 
                                                
6
 Entropy is defined by – 𝑝×𝑙𝑜𝑔!𝑝, where p is the (0-1) normalized salience of each pixel, and the summation is 
taken over all pixels on an image. Higher numbers indicate more concentration of salience (entropy is minimized when all 
values of p are equal). It can be used to characterize the complexity of the image. E.g., a picture with some content on it 
has less entropy than a white blank paper.  
7
 An important mathematical touchstone is “correlated equilibria”. (Aumann 1974). A correlated equilibrium occurs 
when both players see private signals—which may be correlated between the players—and condition their strategies on 
their signals and their knowledge of correlation. Stop signs and green-yellow-red traffic lights, for example, act as 
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locations in x-y space are being chosen. Players click on a pixel but their choice 
circle is a 180-pixel circle around their chosen location (an area about the size of a 
nickel coin). Matching is defined by circle overlap.8  
 
For a matching coordination game, it is useful to think about both pure strategy 
and mixed equilibria. Any two pixels (response clicks) chosen by the two players, 
that fall within the diameter of the circle constitutes a pure strategy Nash 
equilibrium. One image contains about two million (1920*1080 pixels) points. 
Any match is a pure equilibrium, so there are an enormous number of equilibria. 
In addition, there are many equilibria in which players mix equally across a subset 
of different locations. For example, if both players choose equally randomly 
among all pixels, that mixture is also an equilibrium.   
For the hider-seeker game, there is a unique Nash equilibrium in which all 
locations are chosen equally often. For those unfamiliar with game theory, 
intuition can be gained by a simplified example. Suppose there are just two 
locations and the hider chooses them with probabilities p and 1-p. If the seeker 
matches those probabilities she has a p2+(1-p)2 chance of winning. This sum is 
always lower if the seeker chooses the most likely spot (i.e., the location with 
p>.5) because if p> 0.5, then p> p2+(1-p)2. To defend against this, the hider 
should mix equally, so p = 0.5. Every new location that is added should also have 
a 1/n chance of being chosen (if there are n locations) by an iterated logic. 
The proof that equal randomization over all strategies is the unique hider-seeker 
equilibrium puts logic ahead of bio-logic. The last thing the brain wants to do is to 
choose many objects that are different equally often. The human perceptual 
                                                                                                                                
correlating devices to create a commonly-observed visual signal which coordinate traffic and reduce accidents. In these 
terms, our study is about whether visual salience of image locations works as a correlating device.  
8 The mapping from pixels to choice circles means that the size of the circle around the chosen pixel will influence 
random matching rates, increasing and decreasing them for larger and smaller circles. This is a feature that could be 
exploited in future research. 
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system evolved to efficiently filter a huge amount of information hitting the 
retina, estimated to be 10! bits of information, into only about 100 bits, by 
focusing attention on only most valuable information—the most salient. For the 
same reason we are so good at quickly noticing salient information, we may be 
naturally bad at choosing what is unsalient.9  
b. Matching games  
To analyze the behavioral data, we first tested whether subjects are playing an 
equal random mixture across all pixels (and associated saliency levels). To 
compare results from different images, all saliency values in this section refer to 
the normalized levels, which are the rank percentiles of raw measures from the 
algorithm, ranked within each image. We calculated the normalized saliency 
value for each click point (the choice saliency level) and then compared these 
values against the baseline of equal randomization independent of salience. 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests reject the hypothesis of randomness for all treatment 
condition sub-blocks (p<10-4).  
To get a direct view of how salience affects choices, we plot the choices from 
all the subjects on two different specific images, shown in the top and bottom 
rows of the left column of Figure 5. The saliency heat map (middle column) uses 
redder colors to show more salient locations from the SAM algorithm. The right 
column shows, in redscales, frequencies of subjects’ location choices in matching 
“human feedback” (top) and “human no-feedback” (bottom) sub-blocks on a 
                                                
9
 A similar conflict between logic and biology occurs in the games “rock, paper, scissors” and maching pennies 
(e.g.,Belot, Crawford, and Heyes 2013).  When players display the three choices with their hands, there is a slight tendency 
to match an opponent’s choice (e.g., playing rock against rock) more often than predicted in equilibrium. The explanation 
is that imitation of another person’s body movements is such a highly-adapted automatic behavior, that the brain cannot 
inhibit the response, even though it reduces performance (e.g. you should play paper rather than imitating rock).  
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single grayscale image. The predicted saliency in the middle column and the 
observed choice maps in the right column are highly overlapping.  
 
 
FIGURE 5：MATCHING GAME EXAMPLE DATA. 
(Left column) Two original images in top and bottom rows. (Middle column) The original images overlaid by SAM 
saliency heat map. (Right column) grayscale original image overlaid with the actual empirical choice distributions. The 
upper image is a sample from “feedback sub-session”, the lower image is a sample from “no-feedback sub-session”. The 
redness of the locations indicates more choice clicks around that location. 
 
Statistically, the mean of the choice saliency level in the coordination game 
“no-feedback” sub-block is 0.87, which is far above chance (0.5) (p-value < 10-4, 
95% confidence interval (CI): (0.86,0.88), t-test).  In the “feedback” sub-block, 
this level increases further to 0.95 (p-value < 10-4, one-tailed paired-t test against 
“no-feedback” sub-block).   
Figure 6 below is a Q-Q plot, plotting the percentage rank of saliency for each 
location against the percentage rank of choice frequencies for those locations. To 
get the Q-Q plot, we first mapped all users’ choice data (not only click points, but 
all points which fell into the circle) onto a one-dimensional saliency value, 
normalized from zero to one (The highest saliency point in each entire image is 
one, and the lowest is zero). Then we ranked all these realized saliency values for 
all choices in the targeted sub-block. We also transformed the rank of the choice 
frequencies across all subjects into rank percentages. We plotted the normalized 
saliency value, which was also the percentage of saliency, against the percentage 
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of points chosen with the same saliency ranking. The Q-Q plot below shows that 
all quantiles of choice data are above the same quantiles of saliency level, and 
hence above the diagonal dashed line that would result if people were choosing 
independently of saliency.    
 
FIGURE 6: MATCHING GAME Q-Q PLOT OF QUANTILES OF CHOICE FREQUENCY (X-AXIS) AND QUANTILES OF SALIENCY RANKS 
(Y-AXIS). 
The red-diamond point (0.15,0.4) indicates that only 15 percent of choice points were made at the locations at or below 
40% salience. Equivalently, 85% of the points fall within the top 60% most salient points. Choices generated by chance 
would thus correspond to a diagonal line of this plot from (0,0) to (1,1). The maximal accuracy is the blue line: y =1 for all 
x>0, which means that all choices fall on exactly the most salient point. 
 
c. Hider-seeker games 
For the hider-seeker game, we present two panels of plots for hiders (Figure 7) 
and seekers (Figure 8) separately for two specific example images, using the same 
display as in Figure 5. Figures 7-8 show that subjects’ choices (right column) are 
much more spread out in both hiding and seeking compared to the concentrated 
saliency maps (middle column), than in the matching coordination games where 
saliency and choice strongly overlapped.  
In Figure 7 the peak of the choice distribution no longer falls in the most salient 
area. However, in this example Figure 8 seeking game, the most salient locations 
are still chosen frequently by seekers (suggesting that, in this example, seekers are 
not being very strategic). 
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FIGURE 7:  HIDING GAME IMAGES, SALIENCY, AND  CHOICE   
Left column: original images. Middle column: original image overlaid by saliency heat map. Right column: grayscale 
original image overlaid by user choice empirical distribution (the upper image is a sample from “feedback sub-session”, the 
lower image is a sample from “no-feedback sub-session”). 
 
 
 
FIGURE 8: SEEKING GAME IMAGES, SALIENCY, AND  CHOICE   
Left column: original images. Middle column: original image overlaid by saliency heat map. Right column: grayscale 
original image overlaid by user choice empirical distribution (the upper image is a sample from “feedback sub-session”, the 
lower image is a sample from “no-feedback sub-session”). 
 
The general statistics are consistent with the direction of effects in these two 
examples. In the hiding game, the mean saliency level of user click points in no-
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feedback and feedback is 0.48 10  and 0.53, close to chance level 11 . The 
corresponding statistics in seeking game  are 0.6212 and 0.6113. A replication 
sample (N = 29) with ten times higher payoffs yields very similar results, 0.51 
and 0.64 for hiders and seekers (feedback only)14. 
Comparing the results between hiders and seekers, it is statistically significant 
that people chose salient locations more in the seeking game (any sub-block) than 
in the hiding game (any sub-block) (one-tailed paired t-test, p < 10-4), which 
reflects what showed in figure 7 and figure 8. 
 
 
FIGURE 9: STRATEGIES SUBJECTS USED FOR HIDE AND SEEK GAME  
a, b: Q-Q plots for hiding role (a) and seeking role (b). c, d: kernel pdf density map of the choice frequency as a function of 
location saliency ranks. The x- axis is the rank of the saliency values and the y-axis is the probability density (plotted 
                                                
10
 p-value = 0.1, one-sample t-test, CI: (0.46,0.50) 
11
 p-value = 0.02, one-sample t-test CI: (0.51,0.56) 
12
 p-value <10-4, one-sample t-test, CI: (0.59,0.64) 
13
 mean = 0.61, p-value =0.43, paired t-test against no-feedback sub-block 
14
 Hiding: p-value = 0.59, CI: (0.48,0.54), seeking: p-value <10-4 
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separately for feedback and no feedback sessions).  Note: The kernel is Gaussian. The bandwidth is calculated using the 
formula: 𝜎× !!!!.!, in which 𝜎 is the standard deviation of the samples and N is the number of observations. 
 
Figure 9 presents both Q-Q plots and density maps in the hiders-seeker game. 
Figures 9 a-b indicate that seekers’ choices are more biased towards salient 
locations than hiders’ choices are, and both are much less saliency-biased than in 
the matching games (recall Figure 6). Keep in mind, however, that the hiders 
should be choosing locations as low in salience as they can perceive (i.e., a best-
response Q-Q curve would be underneath the 45-degree identity line).  
The density maps in Figures 9 c-d take every location in every game, and assign 
each one a saliency level (0-1 normalized within each image), and computes the 
frequency with which “strategies” (=locations) were chosen across all games and 
subjects. For hider-seeker games these should be flat horizontal lines (except for 
sampling error). However, there are a disproportionate number of choices of high-
saliency locations (that is, the densities turn up sharply at the right end of the 
scale). Seekers choose the highest-saliency locations about three times as often, 
and hiders choose them about two times as often. There is a slightly 
disproportionate tendency to choose the lowest saliency locations (near zero at the 
left end of the scale), especially for hiders. 
 
c. Seekers’ advantage 
In this section, we report the realized matching rate in all conditions and 
compare it to the chance outcome. The theoretical value for two circles to match 
from two random players is four times the area (distance within a larger circle of 
two times the diameter of the original circle) of the circle used in the experiment 
over the entire area (1920*1080). That frequency is 0.071.  
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Table 1 presents the realized matching probability in a specific sub-block. All 
values were calculated from the average of 500 iterations of randomly matching 
two data points from the dataset if two subjects were in the same sub-block, same 
image.  
 
 TABLE 1: REALIZED MATCHING RATES  
 Number of Observations No feedback Feedback 
Nash mixed prediction  0.071 0.071 
Matching game 1147 0.35 (4e-4) 0.64 (4e-4) 
Hider-seeker game 1090 0.09 (3e-4) 0.09 (3e-4) 
Hider-seeker game high 
payoff 
 462 ---- 0.09 (6e-4) 
 
 Statistical tests against null hypothesis that seeking win rate is the baseline level and choices are independently and 
identically distributed across subjects (which is the Nash benchmark prediction)
15
.    
In the higher payoff session, subjects received 10 times the payment received in the previous session hider-seeker game. 
 
As in many other studies of matching, there is quite successful coordination in 
the matching game based on salience:  A successful match happened five to ten 
times more frequently than in the random-matching benchmark. In the hider-
seeker game, there is a significant seeker’s advantage across all conditions we 
tested (as seen in most other studies e.g. RTH, 1994, Crawford and Iriberri, 2007). 
This advantage does not disappear or diminish in the high-payoff session when 
subjects could earn ten times more. 
Note that while a 9% win-rate for seekers may not seem much larger than 7%, 
the test assumes the null hypothesis that 7% is the matching rate which should, in 
the Nash equilibrium, be identically distributed for all periods and all people. 
Since there are very many observations when pooled together, when 
                                                
15
 Tests to compare the matching rates with random baseline were carried out by bootstrapping a hiding data and a 
different person’s seeking data (or two data points from matching game) for 1000 batches (batch size is total number of 
different pairs). We get the empirical distribution for the matching rate and statistical significance against baseline 0.071 
from that bootstrap. Specifically, each sample is drawn by matching two random users (different ones). The batch seeking 
win rate is calculated accordingly.  
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independence is assumed the test has enough power to establish that 9% is 
significantly higher than 7%. Two more conservative approaches are to compare 
the actual and predicted hider-seeker match rates across images (averaging all 
data within-image) and across people. These tests allow dependence of trials 
within an image, and within a person. The results indicate that seeker’s advantage 
still remain significant using either pooling methods16.   
6. A Saliency-perturbed Cognitive Hierarchy Model (SCH) 
In this section we describe a parametric behavioral model meant to explain the 
main patterns in choices and their salience-sensitivity. Following Crawford and 
Iriberri (2007a), it uses step-level thinking. The level-k model was introduced by 
Stahl and Wilson (1994) and Nagel (1995). Camerer, Ho, and Chong (2004) later 
proposed a modified cognitive hierarchy (CH) version with a slightly different 
specification about what each level type believes about others. See Crawford, 
Costa-Gomes, and Iriberri (2013) for a thorough review.   
To explain the behavioral findings, we developed a model that combines 
cognitive hierarchy, a quantal response function (softmax) and a saliency-
perturbed level 0 assumption. 
Model description  
The population consists of different levels of players starting from level zero 
and with level 𝑘 players with frequency ƒ (𝑘) (assuming to be Poisson distributed 
with parameter τ).  
 
                                                
16
 Pooling across individuals (N=29) gives matching statistics for each of the individual image and tests those against 
the .071 benchmark. The p-values are 0.002 and 0.0005 for no-feedback and feedback conditions. Pooling across images 
(N=19) for each subject gives p-values of 0.002 for both cases.  
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For all levels of players, we allow some degree of randomness and mistakes due 
to the large space of choices, which will be described using a normal softmax 
function !!!!!! !!!  with parameter λ . When λ  equals zero, agents choose pure 
randomly without any response to differences in valuation. When λ approaches 
infinity, agents choose the best option.  
In this specification the nonstrategic level zero players weakly prefer salient 
choices. Preference is incorporated by a kind of subjective value assigned to 
saliency of choices. Formally, the probability of choosing point n depends on the 
saliency value17 S! in a softmax format with a common softmax parameter18 𝜆 
and saliency perturbation rate 𝜇 :  
 
𝑃!! = 𝑒!"!!𝑒!" !!!  
 
Other than level zero players, all other levels of players behave in the same way 
as in CHC. Level 𝑘 players assume that all other players are only of lower levels 
(0 to 𝑘 − 1) and softmax respond to the expected behaviors of such an imagined 
opponent group. Therefore, the probability for player 𝑖 choosing option 𝑛 is: 
𝑃!" = 𝑒!!"!"𝑒! !"!"!  
 
In the equation above, EU!" stands for the standard expected monetary payoff 
of the level k players by choosing the point 𝑛: 
                                                
17
 We will use the direct saliency measure from the algorithm (raw value) for the modeling input instead of normalized 
ones (saliency ranks). The difference is that saliency ranks distributed linearly among points while the raw value 
distributed closer to exponential distribution.  In the Q-Q plot, normalized values makes the results comparable with 
chance diagonal line since rank value is linearly distributed.  
18
 This parameter will be used for the softmax function for all level players, instead of using level-specific ones. Many 
variants of these models are possible (e.g., Rogers, Palfrey, and Camerer 2009) 
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 E𝑈!"!  =  𝑅!𝑃{!,!…!!!}!! , E𝑈!"!  =  𝑅!(1− 𝑃{!,!…!!!}!! ) 
 
The superscripts s and h stands for roles in the hider-seeker game. R is the 
monetary reward value for each game.  𝑃{!,!…!!!}!!  and 𝑃{!,!…!!!}!!  is a mixed 
probability of level zero to k-1 choosing choice n calculated by linear combining 
their strategies using a normalized Poisson distribution. 
Note well that saliency only enters into the responses of level-0 players. The 
challenge is to see whether saliency which only directly influences the lowest-
level 0 players then has an amplified effect on higher-level thinkers, through their 
beliefs and then through their choices (a la Mehta et al’s (1994a) “secondary 
salience” concept).  
This model has three free parameters 𝜇, λ, τ to fit. The parameters capture the 
preference for saliency of level zero players 𝜇, the degree of response smoothing 
in softmax λ, and the average levels of strategic thinking in the population τ, 
respectively. We constrained the softmax parameter λ19 and the saliency weight 𝜇 
to be the same between hiding and seeking but allowed a difference in τ, to see 
whether average thinking levels might differ according to roles. We fitted the 
model with the data in the hider-seeker game, using the hiding game and seeking 
game together for both sub-sessions (“feedback”, “no-feedback”), using 
maximum likelihood. To have enough data for training, we used the entire first 
sessions as our training sets and the second sessions as validation test sets. The 
best fitted parameters and measures of fit are shown in Table 2.  
 
                                                
19
 The range of λ is allowed from 0 to 100. Larger λ does not carry more information since the exponential function 
makes the predicted action approaching best response fast. While allowing λ to be free more globally makes it impossible 
to do the bootstrapped confidence interval due to the non-smoothness feature of the target function. More discussions about 
the feature of the target function are included in Appendix. 
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TABLE 2: BEST-FIT SET OF PARAMETERS 
   Hider Seeker 
Best fitting λ = 100 𝜇 = 0.06 τ! = 0.4 τ! = 0.1 
Number of 
observation 
  1096 1090 
 Likelihood training  -5.78 
 Likelihood testing  -5.86 
AIC 11.57 
BIC 42.04 
95% Confidence 
interval 
[72.3,100.0] [0.05,0.08] [0.32,0.47] [0.08,0.13] 
The parameter λ and 𝜇 is constrained to be the same for both hiders and seekers. The confidence interval in the 
table is calculated using bootstrap method with batch size 1096 for hider, 1090 for seeker and number of 
iterations 100.  
 
 
The best-fit values of τ’s, 0.4 and 0.1, indicate that most people did not do 
many iterative thinking steps when they made their choice. These low values of  τ 
match with some previous findings (Fudenberg and Liang 2018). The estimation 
of τ in Camerer, Ho and Chong (2004) and many other papers is often higher, 
around τ= 1.5 (see also Crawford et al 2013).  
We think the low values of τ estimated in our data might results from a tradeoff 
between the simplicity of visual choice games and the ability to identify all 
parameters in an SCH model. The best way to identify τ, for example, is with 
games where different level types choose distinct strategies in a way that is 
carefully designed to separate them (see Stahl and Wilson 1995; Nagel  1995; 
Costa-Gomes and Crawford 2006; Kneeland 2015; Fragiadiakis, Kovaliukaite, 
and Arjona 2017; Costa-Gomes and Crawford 2006). In our visual choice games 
there are usually a small number of salient locations; most players choose those or 
(if hiding, for example) approximately randomize over other locations. This 
makes it hard to precisely identify the weight on salience, the response sensitivity, 
and the levels separately. However, it is notable that the overall likelihood is -5.78 
in the training set and only slightly worse, -5.86, in the test set. This indicates that 
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we are not overfitting by very much (since otherwise the decrease from training to 
test fit would be much larger).    
Figure 10 shows the comparison between real density maps versus model 
predicted density maps for the hider-seeker game in training (Figs 10ab) and out-
of-sample test data (Figs 10cd). From the data distributions (blue lines), it can be 
seen that there was a sharp density increase starting around 0.9 saliency level for 
both games as well as a minor decreasing trend from the lowest saliency to 0.9 
saliency level for hiders but increasing trend for seekers. The CH model was able 
to capture both of these features of the data.   
 
 
   
 
FIGURE 10: COMPARING FREQUENCY OF CHOICE BY SALIENCY LEVEL WITH MODEL FITTED DISTRIBUTIONS.  
The x-axis is the saliency values of all click points (normalized to range from 0 to 1 in each image). Each point on a graph 
indicated what percentage of choices were made for locations within images based on the saliency of those locations. a: 
choice data and model prediction in the training dataset seeking condition. b: choice data and model prediction in the 
training dataset hiding condition. c: choice data and model prediction in the testing dataset seeking condition. d: choice 
data and model prediction in the testing dataset hiding condition. 
 
According to the best-fit τ′s, there existed a large percentage of level zero 
population for both hiders and seekers, whose behaviors were only dominated by 
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saliency value. Besides the actual level zero players’ effect on population 
behavior, such saliency biases from level zero players also affected higher level 
players’ strategies when they were forming beliefs on lower levels.  
 
 
 
FIGURE 11: STRATEGY DISTRIBUTIONS OF DIFFERENT LEVEL PLAYERS PREDICTED BY THE MODEL 
The blue curves on both figures correspond to level zero strategies. In the seeker’s case (a), players at level 1 and above 
highly prefer salient locations. In the larger graph, all levels 1-5 are plotted as green. The inset graph shows there is some 
variation in sensitivity of level 1 types and above, which can only be seen with a finer-grained y-axis of density. In the 
hider case (b), level 0 players choose strategies with increase with salience, and all higher-level types choose less salient 
locations more often.  
 
Based on the best-fit saliency weight value 𝜇 (0.06), the perturbation towards 
saliency is not that large. It only changes the probability of choosing in the top 5% 
salient area to 0.14 from the even chance level 0.05 (as blue curves show in 
Figure 11). Though the hiders and the seekers share the same level zero strategy 
(by assumption), the strategies of higher levels (𝑘 ≥ 1) are affected in different 
ways: hiders prefer unsalient places while seekers choose the most salient 
locations more often. Such mixed choice distributions of both level zero and 
higher-level players are able to explain the trend differences in Figure 10 —the 
seekers’ aggregated choice distribution is monotonically increasing in saliency 
while the hiders’ aggregated choice distribution first has a small decrease, then 
has a sharp increase at the maximal saliency. 
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 Cross-game predictive validation:  
To further test the generalizability of the model, we use parameters estimated 
from fitting the SCH model to hider-seeker data to then predict behavior in the 
matching game. There is no guarantee that this cross-game portability will work 
well. Identification of the saliency weight 𝜇 in hider-seeker comes from the level 
0’s and from higher-level types who sometimes try to match the level 0 opponents 
and sometimes mismatch. In the matching games, all higher-level types are 
guided by salience since they are trying to match the level 0’s. The strength of 
salience-sensitivity that is estimated in the two cases could easily be different 
(which is precisely Heap et al’s (2014) point).  
The left panel in Figure 13 shows the comparison between the experimental 
data distribution from matching games, and the model-predicted distribution using 
the best-fit parameters from the hider-seeker game. The fit is visually reasonable, 
except that the prediction clearly underestimates the big jump in empirical choice 
frequency at the highest saliency level.  
The right panel of Figure 12 presents the fitting result by letting τ be a free 
parameter maximizing fit in the matching data while fixing the other two 
parameters from hider-seeker result. The best-fit τ is 0.87, which is higher than 
the values estimated in hider-seeker game.  
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FIGURE 12: THE SCH MODEL CALIBRATED ON HIDER-SEEKER GAME DATA CAN PREDICT MATCHING GAME CHOICES.  
The comparison between the matching data distribution and the fitted matching game distribution. (a) Uses all parameter 
estimates from the hider-seeker game to predict matching game results. BIC: 24.83 (b) allows 𝛕 to be a free parameter in 
the matching game (fixing 𝝁 and 𝛌 to the estimates from hider-seeker games) in order to test where there is any change in 𝛕 
between games. BIC: 24.51 
 
6.  Further results  
a. How predictable is the matching rate across images?  
An additional hypothesis based on SCH is that the differences in the matching 
rate across images should be affected by their saliency distributions. When 
saliency is highly concentrated then the rate of choosing the same pixels (and 
hence matching) should also be highly concentrated in matching games. 
Specifically, we hypothesized that the number of local maxima20 for the saliency 
distribution on an image should be negatively correlated with the matching rate in 
matching games. For example, most people should prefer to play the matching 
game on a white paper with only one star in the center (a single peak of the 2D 
                                                
20
This number is calculated using function imregionalmax() and a Gaussian filter, more details see Appendix Method. 
For all images, the number of peaks ranges from one to five. We also tested whether entropy of an image is correlated with 
its matching rate. There is a correlation but it is weaker and sensitive to outliers (p = 0.18 for no feedback and p = 0.36 for 
feedback session)  
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saliency distribution) instead of a white paper with four identical stars (four peaks 
of saliency) in four corners.  
 
 
FIGURE 13 : CORRELATION ACROSS IMAGES BETWEEN MATCHING RATE AND NUMBER OF SALIENCY CENTERS FOR AN IMAGE. 
Note: Right figure shows the bootstrapped values of correlations used to construct the confidence interval of 
bootstrapped correlations reportedin the left figure.  
 
Figure 13 shows that in matching games (both sub-sessions), the matching rate 
is negatively correlated with the number of saliency centers (Pearson r = -0.64, p 
= 0.0001). With larger image set and datasets, later work might be able to 
accurately predict the matching rate based on input context and corresponding 
attention maps. 
b. Time pressure 
If the model we proposed is on the right track, manipulating the average 
strategic levels of the population should change the percentage of those choosing 
the most salient locations, which could change the associated seeker’s advantage. 
One way to potentially lower average strategic levels is to force subjects to make 
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decisions more quickly, under time pressure. For example, Spiliopoulos, 
Ortmann, and Zhang (2018) found that people tend to choose more heuristic 
strategies when facing a time constraint, in several normal form games.  If higher 
levels of strategic thinking take more time (e.g., Brocas et al. 2014), time pressure 
will correspond to reducing the value of τ. Time pressure should therefore 
increase the seeker’s advantage.   
To test this hypothesis, we compared two new groups from mTurk. The control 
group (N=38) faced exactly the same experimental setting as the lab subjects 
(with a constraint of 6s for response). The treatment group (N=31) had a shorter 
time constraint of 2s. All other features of the design were unchanged.21  
We first measured the seeker advantage between control and treatment groups. 
In the control condition, the online group still shows a significant seeker’s 
advantage at precisely the same rate, 0.09, as in the local lab population. This 
seeker advantage increased significantly to 0.23 in the time pressure group no-
feedback condition (p-value <10-4, t-test) and to 0.15 (p-value <10-4, t-test) in the 
time pressure group feedback condition22. Thus, our understanding of how 
saliency interacts with the depth of strategic thinking enabled us predict a large 
change in seeker advantage due to time pressure. Keep in mind that nothing in 
standard equilibrium analysis predicts these types of effects, because neither 
response time nor salience are part of the conventional game specification or 
behavioral analysis.   
 
 
 
 
                                                
21
 For both conditions, trials with no click point recorded during the time constraint occurred in 13.3% of trials for the 
control group and 14.7% for the treatment group. The numbers of observations for feedback and no feedback group 
differed less than 5%.  The smaller one is reported 
22
 The same bootstrapping method that was used in previous seeker’s advantage estimation was used here. 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3308886 
 35 
TABLE 3: BEST-FIT SET OF PARAMETERS 
  Number of 
Observations 
No feedback Feedback 
Baseline   0.071 0.071 
Matching  Local control group 1147 0.35 (4e-4) 0.64 (4e-4) 
 Online control group 458 0.41 (0.001) 0.63 (0.001) 
 Online time-pressure 
group 
388 0.31 (0.001) 0.63 (0.001) 
Hider-seeker Local control group 1090 0.09 (3e-4) 0.09 (3e-4) 
 Online control group 441 0.09 (6e-4) 0.09 (6e-4) 
 Online time-pressure 
group 
372 0.23 (0.001) 0.15 (9e-4) 
 
To investigate whether this increase in seeker’s advantage was due to subjects 
choosing more salient locations under time pressure, we compared the mean 
saliency level of location choices in the control and treatment. For the hider role, 
the mean level of choice saliency significantly increased when people under time 
pressure, from 0.52 to 0.63 and 0.52 to 0.59 for the no-feedback condition and the 
feedback condition, respectively. The corresponding increases in saliency of 
seeker choices were from 0.65 to 0.81 and from 0.61 to 0.81.  
 
c. Hidden Markov model  
The most direct way to measure visual attention is through eye movements.  
The first thing we looked at was whether the attention levels were distributed in 
the same way in our game environment versus free viewing (i.e., predicted by the 
SAM algorithm). We found that subjects often looked at the most salient locations 
first no matter what game conditions they were facing. The average saliency level 
of the first fixation is 0.92 for matching, 0.88 for seeking and 0.81 for hiding23. 
All those levels are significantly higher than 0.50 (t-test, P < 10!!).  
To further understand the mechanism behind such strategic decision process, 
we modeled the gaze trajectory using a hidden Markov process (HMM). HMM is 
                                                
23
 These percentages were calculated for both sub-sessions pooled in one game.  
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a common method for understanding sequential data and solving cognition 
problems (Rabiner 1989). A hidden Markov model hypothesizes a set of states, 
and rates of transition from state to state in discrete time periods. The forward and 
backward estimation algorithm (Murphy 2005) is then used to estimate Gaussian 
distributions of state-variable distributions, and transition rates. The HMM we 
applied has four states—a starting node and a decide node, and both unsalient and 
salient nodes. In the latter nodes, people are looking at either low- or high-salient 
locations, where the distributions of saliency within each of the two nodes are 
Gaussian distributed, and the mean and variance of the two Gaussians are 
estimated empirically. We briefly mention the main results here. More details are 
in an Appendix.  
Although most subjects started with looking at the most salient object, the 
fixations afterwards varied by games and player roles. Subjects transition to the 
unsalient node in the hider-seeker game at rates of 32% and 20% respectively-- 
the hiders transition to looking at low-salience more often. In the matching game, 
they transited from salient areas to unsalient areas only 8% of the time.  
The results above support the critical assumption in the model that agents favor 
more salient areas in all games. Rather than guessing and inferring according to 
the existing patterns of the choice data, eye movement data directly points out that 
the biases came from the way people distribute their attention. In addition, it 
confirms that modeling attention using SAM algorithm tuned on free view data 
works well here, since the first fixation can be predicted with over 80% accuracy 
by this algorithm, even in game environments.  
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7.  Conclusion  
We measured visual salience in two-player games, in which player chooses 
locations in images, and desire to match or mismatch. Salience predicted from a 
finely calibrated neural network algorithm (SAM) is a strong predictor of 
observed choices.  
Our approach specifies salience precisely. It is a use case of how the 
neuroscience of vision, filtered through psychology and helped by computer 
science, can help answer questions of long-standing interest in economics.  
The foundation for the SAM algorithm is earlier algorithms (e.g.,Itti, Koch, and 
Niebur 1998)) specifying computationally how layers of visual cortex process 
orientation, contrast, and color at different spatial scales and integrate them. The 
particular SAM algorithm we apply been calibrated empirically by eyetracking 
data from people freely looking at images. Following Crawford and Iriberri 
(2007), salience is then embedded in a cognitive hierarchy model. Parameter 
estimates generate an observed seeker’s advantage. Estimates can be used to 
predict from one type of game (HS) to another (matching), showing evidence of 
portability that Hargrave Heaps et al (2014) did not see in their data. Our novel 
evidence of cross-game portability answers the first question that motivated our 
paper.  
A new prediction that time pressure should increase the seeker’s advantage is, 
based on the hypothesis that lower-level SCH thinking is rapid and more salience-
biased, this prediction is confirmed by new data.  
The salience-dependent sequence of fixations over time, recorded by 
eyetracking, confirms the hypothesis that people look at more salient locations 
first. A hidden Markov model captures these transitions and shows some 
interesting differences across games.  
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The second motivating question is whether salience is a general principle that 
can be used to specify level-0 choice in CH or level-k models. The goal is to 
replace different level-0 specifications used for games with matrix games, private 
information games, and games with large number sets, based on some common 
principle.24  
In our data visual salience provides a promising account of level 0. “Primary 
salience” (what is preferred or privately chosen) has been shown in early 
experiments by Mehta et al to explain matching rather well. Other games have not 
used the language of primary salience but are consistent with the idea that private 
preference (e.g., lucky numbers) influence choices.25  
In matrix games, another type of salience which is promising as a level-0 basis 
is abstract properties of strategies (e.g., maximax) or strategy vectors (e.g. payoff 
equality) (following the early ideas of Mehta, Starmer and Sugden 1994ab on 
spatial and abstract norms of property rights). Wright and Leyton-Brown (2016) 
develop a “meta-model” of level 0 from structural features of game payoffs 
which, when embedded in CH, outpredicts the assumption of random level 0 play 
(see also Lopes-Perez et al 2014 and Leland and Schneider 2018). Evidence of 
differential attention to payoffs that are large or maximin is also consistent with 
experiments on endogeneous allocation of attention by Avoyan and Schotter 
(2018).  
A related type of salience appears to be evident in games with private 
information. In many such games, there is a natural mapping between private 
information states, and strategies. Two examples are sender-receiver games and 
                                                
24
 Note that in this conception of level-0 as generally salient, not random, the assumption of randomization is 
equivalent to no strategy being any more salient than any other.  
 
25
 Ho, Camerer, and Weigelt (1998) found a large number of Singaporean subjects choosing 80 or 88 in the 2/3-of-the-
average p-beauty contest game (because “8” is a lucky number for many Chinese). In a Swedish lottery game LUPI 
choosing numbers from one to 5 digits, Östling et al. (2011) found that disproportionately many people picked numbers 
corresponding to birth years (e.g., 1900-2000). 
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auctions. In sender-receiver experiments,  senders tend to choose “honest” 
response, using the state they observe as the message, more often than predicted 
by theory (Cai and Wang 2006; Wang, Spezio, and Camerer 2010, and Crawford 
2003). 
In auctions, bidders observe a signal of value. CH models based on level-0 
bidders who simply bid their signal (rather than randomize) can explain some 
deviations from equilibrium bidding (Crawford and Iriberri 2007b). In both of 
these cases, it is likely that the private state or value signal is highly salient (as 
shown using eyetracking by Wang et al 2010).  The hypothesis that level 0s are 
influenced by such salience helps explain overall behavior.  
A promising path to explore is whether one or more concepts of salience could 
explain level-0 behavior in all these different results from visual image games, 
games from semantic or choice sets, matrix games, and private information 
games. In matrix games, for example, level-0 strategies that choose high-payoff 
rows or avoid low-payoff rows might because extreme quantities are salient (cf. 
Bordalo et al 2012, 2013ab). In private information games, the observed state may 
be visually or attentionally salient— that is, a level-0 sender may be guided by 
saliency rather than “honesty” per se.  One way to proceed is to use a combination 
of off-the-shelf algorithms (such as SAM) and eyetracking methods26 to see how 
well salience can be predicted, and whether it corresponds at all to payoff 
properties in matrix games or to the tendency to choose a private state as a 
strategy.  
Another simple direction for future research is to consider other behavioral 
models, specifically quantal response equilibrium enhanced by salience in the 
same perturbation way (sQRE). Assuming that all agents weakly preferred salient 
                                                
26
 Frydman and Mormann (2018) record fixations during risky money choices to test behavioral and attentional 
predictions of Bordalo, Gennaoli, and Shleifer (2012). Varying visual contrast (bottom-up salience) also has an effect of 
modulating attentional effects for gamble losses.  
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locations captured by parameter 𝜇, QRE predicts that both parties will favor 
salient locations and have seeker advantages when the softmax parameter 𝜆 is 
small. When 𝜆 is large, the equilibrium restriction can generate a hider advantage 
rather than seeker advantage. (More mathematical details in Appendix). 
In general, quite a lot is known from visual neuroscience about the many drivers 
of salience, both bottom-up and top-down, though less is known about the net 
influence of multiple types of salience on choice (cf.Towal, Mormann, and Koch 
2013).  In principle a general theory of salience is within our grasp and could be 
applied to a wide range of social and economic choices. Indeed, salience has been 
increasingly recognized as a central construct to explain behavior in economic 
applications outside of game theory. Examples include:  
1. In shopping, prices and taxes that are difficult to compute and not 
visibly posted are given less weight (Russo 1977; Ott and Andrus 2000; 
Hossain and Morgan 2006; Min Kim and Kachersky 2006; Chetty, 
Looney, and Kroft 2009). 
2. Store items placed at eye level are chosen more often (including when 
experimentally varied, Dreze, Hoch, and Purk 1994). 
3. Salient “ethnic or religious markers” are proposed as the basis of 
intergroup conflict (Esteban and Ray 2008). 
4. In ordered or displayed choices, such as restaurant menus or roulette 
tables, there is often an “edge [or top-bottom] disadvantage” 
(Christenfeld 1995; Sundali and Croson 2006; Dayan and Bar-Hillel 
2011).  
5. Oppositely of (4), top positions on ballots garner more votes in elections 
(D. E. Ho and Imai 2006), leading many jurisdictions to randomize 
ballot order. 
6. More extreme relative numbers (e.g. higher prices) appear to be more 
salient (see Bordalo, Gennaioli, and Shleifer (2012, 2013a, 2013b).  
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We speculate that these examples may all have something in common: It is 
likely that differences in visual salience are at least part of the reason for the 
differences in salience which affect behavior. In principle, one could use 
eyetracking, clickstreams, memory, and other data to test this hypothesis by 
correlating measured salience to choices, and then establish causality by 
experimentally randomizing variables that influence salience (which can also be 
done in many field settings). 
An illustrative use case about the potential value of visual salience comes from 
the world of “nudges”. Nudges are small changes in the architecture and design of 
choices that can improve choices of people who might make mistakes, without 
imposing a burden on highly-rational choosers.  
Many nudges use physical design details to make information more salient. For 
example,  Karing and Naguib (2018) had Kenyan parents bring their children for 
deworming treatments. They tested whether allowing parents to visibly signal 
their participation to others would improve participation in deworming (which is a 
public good because of infection risk). Note that the signaling is a one-sided 
matching game:  Parents who dewormed prefer a type of signal that others will 
notice, to gain social approval. Salient signals are better.  
Karing and Naguib used two different signals after deworming their children: A 
rubber bracelet that parents could wear around their wrist, or ink on their thumb. 
They note (p. 9), “Bracelets have a high visibility as they are worn around the 
wrist. Ink’s visibility is lower as it is applied to the thumb and only lasts for about 
3 days to 2 weeks (on the skin/on the nail).” They found that awarding bracelets 
increased deworming rates by 24% (greater than financial incentive) but thumb 
ink had little effect.  
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FIGURE 14: ORIGINAL IMAGE OF DEWORMING BRACELET (LEFT) AND GBVS SALIENCY MAP (RIGHT) 
Source: Photograph courtesy of Anne Karing. 
 
Why did the bracelet nudge work so well? 
The authors’ hunch about “high visibility” of bracelets is probably crucial to 
their success. A simple test of whether the bracelets are “visible” is to feed an 
image of a bracelet-wearing participant through the simple GBVS (Harel et al 
2007) algorithm and see if the bracelet is visually salient, as predicted by the 
algorithm.27 Figure 14 shows the result. The authors were right: The heatmap 
predicts intense focus on the two bracelets at the left and lower center (and also 
the t-shirt logo at upper right).  
In this example, salience save lives. In general, ex ante predictions about what 
is visually salient might be useful for some other nudges where the details of 
displays and choice architecture are an important design feature.     
 
  
                                                
27
 Thanks to Anne Karing for sharing this image. We were unable to obtain a similar picture of an inked thumb.  
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 Appendix: Eye movement and fixation analysis using a Hidden Markov 
Model (HMM) 
To preprocess the raw gaze data, we first extracted the 2D gaze positions for 
both eyes on each image during a particular subject’s experiment time. All data 
used were those with validity code (0,028). We took the midpoint of the two eyes’ 
positions as the gaze position in this analysis. Then, we adopted a fixation 
detection algorithm, Eye Movements Metrics & Visualizations (EyeMMV) to get 
fixation centers and transitions using both spacial and durational constraint 
(Krassanakis, Filippakopoulou, and Nakos 2014).  The minimum duration 
threshold we used for fixation detection was 100ms, which has been shown to be 
efficient according to Manor and Gordon (2003).   
 
We first plot several fixation transition samples during the decision periods for 
all games (Figure 15).  
 
 
FIGURE 15: SAMPLE OF FIXATION MAPS 
                                                
28
 In Tobii validity code scale ranges from 0-4 from most valid to least.  
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Each of the image above is a randomly selected fixation observation from a specific sub-session. The red circles on the 
images stand for fixation clusters of the gaze data. Both the number next to the circle and the radius of it indicate its 
duration time. The green numbers next to the circle show the order of visits and the black cross points to the final click 
point. 
 
Figure 15 indicates that subjects often looked at the most salient location first 
no matter what game condition they were facing. The average saliency level of 
the first fixation is 0.92 for matching, 0.88 for seeking and 0.81 for hiding29. All 
those levels are significantly higher than 0.8 (t-test, P < 10!!).  
 
If people always started by looking at the most salient area as fixation data 
showed, how did they end up choosing different locations later? How do they 
transition between salient and unsalient locations? To answer these questions, we 
applied a Gaussion Hidden Markov Model to all fixation data since these gaze 
traces revealed most information of what subjects were considering. The 
fundamental assumption of this model is whether such problem will satisfy 
Markov property, which simply means the probability distribution of any future 
event happening only depends on current states, and independent of the historical 
paths. Towal, Mormann, and Koch (2013) had tested the Markov property was 
valid in general gaze transition problem.  
 
HMM is a probabilistic model of both visible emissions and hidden states 
(Baum and Petrie 1966). It has been largely used in solving speech detection 
problem (Gales and Young 2008),   financial prices predictions (Hassan and Nath 
2005) and other machine learning questions. Each state has a probability 
distribution over some possible outcomes (“tokens”). Here we assume such 
probability distribution is Gaussian, a version called Gaussian HMM.  
 
                                                
29
 It was calculated for both sub-sessions in one game.  
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In this paper, the observations generated by a HMM corresponded to fixation 
transition vectors between hidden states. These vectors will be used to estimate 
the hidden states and transitioning probabilities. The underlying hypothesis is that 
people were deciding between very salient locations and less salient locations, 
which can be seen in HMM as transiting between a salient hidden state and 
another unsalient hidden state (Figure 16). In each hidden state, the HMM creates 
one observed point (one fixation) based on the Gaussian distribution of saliency in 
that state. For instance, if a person is currently as being in the on a salient state S, 
he is statistically likely to be looking at high-salience locations (where the 
Gaussian distribution of salience values in each of the states U and S is estimated 
from the data). After each state, one could either choose to stay on the same state, 
transit to the other state or decide. 
 
 
 
FIGURE 16: HMM MODEL 
Left panel shows the relationship between hidden units and observations. On each hidden unit, the HMM emits an 
observation point (one fixation) on saliency space following a Gaussian distribution. The means of the Gaussian differ 
from high salient space to low salient space. The right panel presents an example emission out of a sample realized state 
transitioning. The red vector is what the fixation transition vector on saliency space looks like. 
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We used the HMM toolbox in Matlab (Murphy 2005) to get the best fitted 
transition matrix and Gaussian parameters in each game (Figure 17). This figure 
demonstrates the different gaze transition patterns among different games. In all 
three game roles, there is a strong tendency to transition from the starting state to 
a salient state (S); those transition probabilities range from 87 to 98%. In both 
states U and S, the predominant transition is stay within the same salience class 
(at rates from 48-61%). In matching games, people are much more likely to 
transition from U to S, searching for a high-salience point, than in the reverse 
direction from S to U (31% > 8%). The opposite is true in hiding and seeking; in 
those game roles, the transition from S to U is more common. After the first 
fixation, different from matching game, people transited more often to unsalient 
locations in hider-seeker game. This finding provides an evidence that people 
shared a common prior, the salient stimulus, during their strategic reasoning 
process.  
  
 
 
 
FIGURE 17: BEST-FITTED TRANSITION PROBABILITY 
These three graphs showed the fitted transition probabilities for matching, hiding and seeking games. The probabilities on 
each arrow showed the estimated transition probability between any two states. The numbers near the red curve and green 
curve in the middle showed the estimated emission probability from each state to observations. We bootstrapped the data to 
get the confidence intervals for these estimates (Appendix, table 3).  
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TABLE 4: THE 95% CONFIDENCE INTERVALS OF ALL ESTIMATES IN FIGURE 10 ARE PRESENTED. 
 Matching Hiding Seeking 
Mean seeker (0.54,0.60) (0.42,0.48) (0.42,0.48) 
Mean hider (0.90,0.91) (0.83,0.86) (0.85,0.87) 
P(S| Begin) (0.97,0.99) (0.84,0.89) (0.90,0.93) 
P(U| Begin) (0.01,0.02) (0.06,0.11) (0.02,0.04) 
P(End|Begin) (0.004,0.01) (0.04,0.06) (0.04,0.07) 
P(S|S) (0.56,0.61) (0.50,0.57) (0.58,0.63) 
P(End|S) (0.32，0.35) (0.16,0.12) (0.17,0.19) 
P(U|S) (0.07,0.10) (0.28,0.36) (0.19,0.24) 
P(S|U) (0.24,0.39) (0.05,0.10) (0.09，0.14) 
P(U|U) (0.42,0.55) (0.56,0.61) (0.54,0.60) 
P(End|U) (0.17,0.25) (0.32,0.36) (0.29,0.34) 
 
S means the salient state and U means the unsalient state. Each probability stands for a transition probability 
from one to another. The first two rows show the mean of the Gaussian distributions for each state. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
For Online Publication 
Appendix: A QRE alternative model 
An alternative model is a saliency perturbed version of  the quantal response 
model (QRE) (McKelvey and Palfrey 1995; Palfrey 2016) In this Appendix. we 
will introduce a QRE model including saliency similarly to how it was adding in 
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the SCH analysis. We will also show some results of how the predicted seeking 
advantage depends on the response parameter.  
Assuming that agent 𝑖 has the following utility function for choosing option 𝑛 in 
a finite strategy space: 
1.  𝑢!" = 𝑀 + 𝜇S! 
 
  M is the monetary reward he gets for choosing that option. He gets extra utility 
from choosing a more salient spot (this could be interpreted as a reduced-form 
way of including attentional costs, as salient locations are less costly to attend to).  
  Players play the game and maximize their expected utility given the salience-
enhanced specification. The logit version of QRE strategy 𝑝 satisfies: 
2.  𝑃!! = !!!!!"(!!!)!!!!!"(!!!)!  
For the particular game used in our experiment, the strategy space is finite with 
each choice corresponding to a pixel on an image, denoted by 𝑛 𝑛 = 1,2,…𝑁 . 
Therefore, in our game, such 𝑃!! described above with 𝑖 = 𝑠 𝑜𝑟 ℎ  plus the 
condition that 𝑃!! = 1 constitutes a quantal response equilibrium. 
 
Without the loss of generality, hider’s winning amount will be set to one and 
seeker’s winning amount will be set to be 𝜎. This way, the equilibrium probability 
can be further written as: 
3.  𝑃!" = !!(!!!!!!!!)!!(!!!!!!!!)!   
4.  𝑃!! = !!(!!!!"!!!!)!!(!!!!"!!!!)!  
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Notice that the denominators of equation 3 and 4 are actually independent of n. 
Therefore, let’s denote each of the denominator as 𝐶! and 𝐶!, respectively. In the 
previous part, we have shown that all the choices need to have positive probability 
to be chosen in order to sustain an equilibrium. Therefore, we can transform 3 and 
4 as below since the right hand sides of the equations are never zero: 
5.  !!"!!! = !!!!"!!!!!!!(!!!!")    
6. ⇔  𝑃!"𝑒!(!!!!")=𝑃!! !!!! 𝑒!"!!!       
 
Now, we want to analyze the matching rate conditioning on the two parameters, 𝜆 and 𝜎. The matching rate is 𝑃!"𝑃!!!!!! . To analyze it, we need a theorem called 
rearrangement inequality (Hardy, Littlewood, and Pólya 1988). 
 
Rearrangement inequality:  
For two real sequences 𝑥! and 𝑦! in order: 7.   𝑥! ≤ 𝑥!… ≤ 𝑥!,       𝑦! ≤ 𝑦!… ≤ 𝑦! 
and an arbitrary permutation 𝑥!(!) 8.  ⟹ 𝑥!𝑦!!!!! ≥ 𝑥!(!)𝑦! ≥ 𝑥(!!!!!)𝑦!!!!!!!!!     
 
Now, let’s sum up all the possible permutations together in the middle so that it 
becomes one. 9.  ⟹ 𝑛 𝑥!𝑦!!!!! ≥ 𝑥! ! 𝑦! ≥ 𝑛 𝑥(!!!!!)𝑦!!!!!!!!! !    10.   𝑥!𝑦!!!!! ≥ !! 𝑥! 𝑦! ≥ 𝑥(!!!!!)𝑦!!!!!!!!! !    
If, 𝑥!  𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑦! are probabilities and add up to one, which is our case,  equation 10 
becomes: 
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11.   𝑥!𝑦!!!!! ≥ !! ≥ 𝑥(!!!!!)𝑦!!!!!   
 
Let’s discuss the matching rate into three cases. Since the RHS of equation 6 is 
an increasing function of 𝑃!, we will focus on the first order derivative of the 
LHS. The conditions are as follows:  
Case 1: P!" <  𝟏! for all i 
From equation 6, we can see that when P!" <  𝟏! , for any 𝑃!" ≥ 𝑃!", 𝑃!! ≥ 𝑃!!. It 
is easy to see by taking the derivative of the right hand side with respect to 𝑃!!.  
 
In addition, since 𝑃!" ≤ 1, this case always happen when λ < 1. 
 
Therefore, the left side of equation 11 applies here: 𝑃!"𝑃!!!!!! ≥ !!  . It 
indicates that there is a seeker’s advantage for. λ < 1 and can be a seeker’s 
advantage for larger values of λ. 
 
Case 2: P!" > 𝟏! for all i 
 
From equation 6, it can be seen that for any 𝑃!" ≥ 𝑃!", 𝐿𝐻𝑆! = 𝑅𝐻𝑆! ≤ 𝑅𝐻𝑆! =𝐿𝐻𝑆! so that 𝑃!! ≥ 𝑃!! and 𝑃!"𝑃!!!!!! ≤ !!. 
 
Since n is finite, therefore, this condition becomes λ > 𝟏!! !"# . As λ becomes 
large enough (people are closer to best-response) a hider’s advantage can occur 
for sufficiently large λ. 
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